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ABSTRACT 
Objective: The current outbreak of the Zaire strain of Ebola virus disease (ZEBOV) within West 
Africa is on a scale unprecedented for any human filovirus, resulting in a public health situation 
requiring a multiagency international response to address a medical and socioeconomic 
emergency in one of the world’s most deprived regions. The aim of this research was to assess 
the risks associated with the disposal of human waste outside of healthcare settings, within 
communities experiencing Ebola virus (EBOV) outbreaks and to generate recommendations 
mitigating these risks.  
Methods: This research utilises the Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
framework: an ideal tool for this scenario as it is low-cost, fit-for-purpose and encourages 
interdisciplinary expertise whilst enabling generation of evidence-based recommendations. This 
work builds upon the successes of Water Safety Plans, which have been applied in over 70 
countries, utilizing the HACCP framework to improve regulation and safe management of 
drinking-water supplies to reduce risks of waterborne diseases. 
Findings: We identify practices associated with health care and faecal waste disposal which 
present unacceptable risk levels for potential EBOV transmission, as well as other blood-borne 
or faecal-oral diseases such as respectively, hepatitis and cholera. We make recommendations, 
based-on existing evidence, for strategies which can reduce and mitigate transmission-risks. 
These strategies, in turn, will reduce the threat to human health, the burden on health services 
and the pressure on national/regional economies. 
Conclusion: This assessment provides compelling evidence that HACCP assessments have 
strong potential as a tool to rapidly respond to emerging infectious disease outbreaks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Emerging infectious diseases are appearing with increasing frequency and presenting substantial 
threats to global health1. The current West Africa outbreak of the Zaire strain of Ebola Virus 
Disease (ZEBOV) caught the local and international community unaware and unprepared, 
presenting the global health world with unprecedented challenges. The effects of this outbreak 
have been felt globally with 28,073 reported cases (including confirmed, probable and suspected 
cases) from 10 nations, resulting in more than 11,290 deaths (as at 02/09/15)2.  
The response to the current ZEBOV outbreak has brought about extraordinary challenges for 
public health care systems and local governments and these will be felt long after the crisis has 
disappeared3. One of the particular challenges has been in the disposal of potentially infected 
faecal and health care waste, especially given the fact that many cases were occurring in high 
population density urban environments.  It has been estimated that within an African Ebola 
treatment centre, each bed, produces up to 300 litres of liquid and excreta waste daily4 any or all 
of which is a potential reservoir for ZEBOV5 and must be disposed of in such a way as to 
minimise risks to public health6. Outside of Ebola treatment centres and hospitals, care of 
patients infected with Ebola virus (EBOV) will result in the production of additional potentially-
contaminated waste, the disposal of which is even more difficult for the public health agencies to 
monitor, coordinate and control. This challenge of safely disposing of the large amount of waste 
generated is complicated by the severe shortage of water and sanitation services in health care 
facilities and in the communities of the three most affected countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone).  According to the most recent data, on average, from those three countries, nearly one 
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third of facilities have no water, 22% have no improved sanitation and 40% have no system to 
manage health care waste7. The situation is similar or most likely worse in households within 
these same countries8. 
The published literature clearly shows that direct contact with the fluids from an infected person 
in the latter stages of the disease is the most likely transmission route for the virus9,10. Yet, given 
the low likelihood of the virus being excreted in urine and faeces and the relatively short survival 
time of the virus in the environment, the risks associated with faeces and urine are relatively low.  
Nevertheless, given the size and location of the recent outbreak, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that in some instances contaminated waste can be considered, certainly in the first 
hours after excretion/secretion by an infected person, or indeed an infected person during the 
incubation period, as a transmission pathway for the virus and must, therefore, be managed and 
disposed of appropriately. Furthermore, faeces in high disease burden settings potentially contain 
a host of pathogens, many of which are more robust in the environment, e.g. Vibrio cholerae, 
hepatitis A and poliovirus, making the safe management and disposal of faeces and associated 
waste, all the more important. 
The aim of this research was to assess the risks associated with the collection and disposal of 
faecal waste within communities experiencing outbreaks of EBOV and to make 
recommendations for mitigating these risks. The approach for this research involved the use of 
the Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP) framework: a tool originally developed 
for food production systems but which have been successfully adapted to manage and mitigate 
risks associated with drinking-water through Water Safety Plans (WSPs).  WSPs have been 
applied in over 70 countries, resulting in better managed and safer water systems that are also 
more resilient to climate change11,12.  In addition, the HACCP approach is increasingly being 
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used to reduce risks related to emerging health threats and infectious diseases15.  The HACCP 
tool has strong application for addressing risks associated with emerging health threats in areas 
where the pathogen’s impacts exceed the capacity of existing healthcare systems as it is both 
low-tech and low-cost in application. As the HACCP methodology encourages the use of 
interdisciplinary expertise whilst enabling the rapid generation of evidence-based 
recommendations, it offers the potential to manage risks when quick control of an outbreak is 
essential but relevant data are incomplete or can only be inferred. This is the case for EBOV, 
where there is a lack of research evidence regarding persistence of EBOV material in sewage and 
related waste materials14.  
Here we apply the HACCP approach15 to the collection and disposal of waste within health 
structures and communities experiencing outbreaks of EBOV. We define waste as both human 
waste (e.g. urine and faeces) and that generated by health care activities. We propose that the 
HACCP method is suitable for generating recommendations when dealing with an emerging 
infectious disease outbreak that presents unprecedented challenges, in this case due to a 
combination of social, economic, environmental and epidemiological factors. We identify 
behaviours and practices linked to waste collection and disposal which are likely to present risks 
for both direct and indirect transmission of EBOV between humans. We then add to the 
discussion on the potential of HACCP assessments to be used as a response tool during emerging 
infectious disease outbreaks, as a precursor to more time-consuming and costly quantitative data 
collection, biomedical testing and clinical studies.  
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METHODS 
In structuring our HACCP process we adapted the guidance contained within the Codex 
Alimentarius General Principles of Food Hygiene Annex to CAC/RCP 1-196915. The annex 
describes 12 steps to the HACCP process, but given our group would not ultimately be 
responsible for implementing the recommended control measures or for establishing the 
subsequent on-the-ground monitoring, the latter steps with the HACCP process were excluded 
from this work. Our modified process follows a previous analysis of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza13 and was: 
1. Assemble the HACCP team ensuring appropriate expertise  
2. Identify waste products within the system 
3. Construct flow diagrams illustrating system in question 
4. Test and confirm flow diagrams 
5. List potential hazards associated with each step and conduct a hazard analysis 
6. Determine critical control points (CCPs) 
7. Establish critical limits for each CCP 
 
The HACCP team 
Given the international and multidisciplinary nature of the problem, we conducted the HACCP 
with both face-to-face meetings and by email exchange.  We brought together an extended group 
from multiple disciplines, including experts in virology, infectious disease epidemiology and 
public health, environmental health, infection control nursing, risk assessment, HACCP, small 
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water systems, water and sanitation engineering and disaster response.  Members of the HACCP 
group were drawn from more than 20 different institutional departments spread across multiple 
countries within Europe, North America and Africa. The geographical diversity of group 
members meant that it was not possible to have a meeting with everyone present. Instead the 
process was started with a series of small meetings held with group members from the University 
of East Anglia. Early progress was shared with a wider group for comment and feedback prior to 
a two-day face-to-face meeting in Nairobi with all African partners in attendance. 
The HACCP process 
This HACCP process is effective as a result of the combination of a systematic approach that 
allows for the synthesis of expert opinion with hard evidence and can bring clarity in an 
otherwise complex public health system. The initial meetings concentrated on defining which 
waste products needing focusing on and then creating the initial flowcharts representing possible 
waste collection and disposal pathways, which were then shared by email with the wider group 
for comment.  Following the initial round of comments the flowcharts were modified at a second 
face-to-face meeting where the initial flowcharts were reviewed, simplified and comments from 
the wider group incorporated.  This process was then further expanded following the two-day 
Nairobi meeting with attendees from a wider panel of international experts, bringing additional 
expertise from the fields of waste water hygiene, sanitation and health interventions. Following 
further consultation, the flowcharts were then critically analysed by an international panel of 
experts before the final simplified versions were produced.  
A hazard was considered to be a process within a developing world setting that could lead to 
contact with waste material contaminated with EBOV thus providing the opportunity for the 
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transmission of Ebola to another person.  Taking into account the likely viral load of the 
contaminated material and based on the frequency with which these hazards are likely to occur, 
they were then grouped into high, medium and lower-risk categories.  
Following validation of the flowchart, the same team of experts then determined appropriate 
Critical Control Points (CCPs). A CCP is a point at which there is the opportunity to control, 
prevent or eliminate the risks for pathogen transmission.  Critical limits were thn set for each of 
the CCPs identified, using a combination of expert knowledge followed by validation through 
consultation of existing literature and current recommendations from organizations including 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). These critical limits 
are thresholds used as preventative measures to control the hazards within the system. The output 
of each of these three principles were cross-referenced with the existing literature on EBOV 
epidemiology, prevention and control. 
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RESULTS  
Hazard Analysis 
Our HACCP assessment of waste disposal within developing world communities identified 
hazardous practices linked to the collection, transportation, disposal, cleaning and storage of 
waste as presenting an unacceptable level of risk of the transmission of EBOV (Table 1). The 
highest level of concern was only attributed to practices involving potential contamination with 
blood; the collection, transportation, cleaning and shared use of blood-soiled fomites and shared 
use of a latrine contaminated with blood or bloodied faeces (Table 1). The medium level of 
concern was assigned to the collection and transportation of material contaminated with non-
blood body fluids, shared use of a latrine soiled with non-blood body fluids, cleaning and shared 
use of non-blood-soiled fomites and contamination of the environment, during collection, 
transportation, of blood-contaminated waste (Table 1). All other activities and practices linked to 
waste disposal were deemed to present a lower level of risk for the transmission of EBOV. 
Critical Control Points and Critical Limits  
In total thirteen CCPs were identified by this HACCP assessment. Each CCP is a point at which 
there is an opportunity to adopt measures to reduce the risks of transmission of EBOV. 
Following extensive consultation and cross-referencing with the existing literature, critical limits 
were then proposed for each CCP, in many cases, multiple recommendations were made for each 
CCP (Table 1). For each CCP, one or more potential hazards were identified and for each hazard, 
one or more sets of recommendations (referred to as critical limits) were made for reducing the 
risk presented by that particular hazard (Table 1). The CCPs identified can be grouped into the 
following categories; collection, transportation, disposal or storage and cleaning of waste. The 
recommendations made for each CCP derive from a combination of i) basic infection control 
11 
 
guidelines (e.g. employing thorough hand hygiene measures); ii) EBOV-specific 
recommendations produced following consultation with the existing literature and iii) 
suggestions for changes to behaviours which can reduce the chances of a person exposing 
themselves to increased transmission risk. 
Several of the critical limits suggested include fundamental aspects of infection prevention and 
control, namely the correct and proper use of full PPE, employing appropriate hand hygiene 
measures and cleaning followed by the use of an appropriate disinfectant. For critical limits more 
specific to filoviruses and/or EBOV, evidence was sought from previous studies (as reported in 
the literature). 
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DISCUSSION 
We present a HACCP analysis of the CCPs for protecting staff and the wider public from the 
disposal of potentially infected liquid and solid waste generated in the care and treatment of 
EBOV-infected patients.  During this assessment 13 CCPs associated with the collection, 
transportation, disposal or storage and cleaning of waste of waste, the use and emptying of 
latrines and fomite re-use were identified (Table 1).  For each CCP we have estimated the level 
of concern and proposed critical limits for their control.  Our analysis accounts for existing 
evidence presented in the published literature and guidance published by international 
organizations e.g. WHO and MSF.  Where this is absent, expert opinion from an international 
panel of experts with expertise in virology, epidemiology, environmental health, water and 
sanitation engineering, and health care provision in low income countries has been sought.  
The HACCP framework allows for a rapid identification of the risks associated to a known 
hazard13, in this case ZEBOV transmission between humans.  The 2013-2015 outbreak of 
ZEBOV has resulted in widespread localised transmission of the virus, the scale of which has 
been attributed to a combination of epidemiological influences alongside social, environmental 
and cultural factors10, including inadequate public health infrastructure and health care systems 
compounded by high urban population densities16,17.  Multiple knowledge gaps exist in our 
understanding of the potential transmission mechanisms and control measures for EBOV10.  It is 
in the context of such knowledge gaps that the process of HACCP provides a systematic 
approach that focuses on prevention of harm and synthesises hard evidence and expert opinion15.  
It is possible that future research may produce results which result in modifications to our current 
recommendations. 
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Previous studies have shown that direct contact with a symptomatic patient is typically 
associated with higher risks of EBOV transmission, particularly during the early stages of the 
disease.  The risk for indirect transmission increases as the disease progresses, with the level of 
contact required to increase the chances of transmission decreasing significantly11,18,19.  Burial 
rituals are known to be a particularly hazardous practices for EBOV transmission, though these 
fall outside the scope of these work11,18,19.  However, transport and disposal of potentially 
contaminated waste also present opportunities for the virus to leave the household/care centre 
and enter the wider community or environment.  Taking into account the likely viral load within 
the contaminated waste, along with the likely opportunity for transmission of the virus via a 
particular activity, the situations which were considered to present the greatest concern level for 
EBOV transmission were always those involving blood-soiled waste (Table 1).  For blood-soiled 
waste, the highest risk CCPs were those where the waste came into contact with another person 
directly (e.g. through the cleaning of a blood-contaminated container) or when the waste 
contaminated a potential viral vehicle (e.g. a container used to transport bloodied waste or a 
contaminated fomite being inadequately cleaned and then passed to another person; Table 1).  
Each of these risks can be eliminated or at least substantially decreased, through the careful 
implementation of the critical limits outlined in Table 1.  When treating a surface potentially 
contaminated with EBOV, there is some evidence to suggest that spraying a surface with 
disinfectant may indeed promote the transmission of viral material20 and thus, in-line with WHO 
recommendations21, we preferentially recommend containment of the spill, followed by cleaning 
of the surface with water and detergent and finally wiping with 0.5% chlorine solution over 
spraying.  This follows guidelines described within the literature22,23 but also allows for the 
following of the precautionary principle, given that within non-clinical settings, it is very 
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possible that those undertaking the cleaning and preparation of solutions for disinfecting do not 
have access to, or the ability to, accurately record time or chemical concentration.  
For waste contaminated with other body fluids, previous studies frequently report a lack of virus 
in stools and/or rectal swabs, even during periods of acute illness12,25,26,27 and data on the 
persistence of EBOV within faeces are scarce11.  With this in mind, stools or faeces were 
considered lower risk pathways for EBOV transmission. Whilst it is not unusual for viral 
material to be detected from samples of non-blood body fluids by RT-PCR, it is unusual to detect 
infectious virus through cell culture.  One study estimates that approximately one in four samples 
of non-blood body fluids collected during active illness was likely to contain viable virus14, 
suggesting that transmission of EBOV via non-blood body fluids is unlikely to occur frequently 
and thus, when considered alongside the poor persistence of EBOV under most environmental 
conditions, non-blood body fluids were all considered to offer a medium or lower risk of 
transmission for EBOV.  It may also be that often body fluids only contain EBOV due to 
contamination from blood. 
Typically, where fomite transmission has been suspected, it is usually possible to trace 
transmission back to instances of direct human-human contact, which is unsurprising given the 
level of care which Ebola patients require, particularly in latter stages, when viral secretion is 
high.  Transmission via food crops and via disposal of waste directly on to the ground were both 
considered to offer minimal risk of transmission of EBOV, primarily due to the lack of evidence 
of this as a transmission pathway for EBOV28 but also taking into account the potential for UV 
solar radiation and other environmental stressors, such as anti-viral microbial activity in soils, to 
cause EBOV inactivation. With that in mind though, it is worth noting that there is substantial 
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evidence highlighting contact with raw sewage as a transmission route for many other 
pathogens29.  Previous research into filoviruses has shown that on clear days at tropical latitudes, 
it can take as little as 20 minutes to generate a 1log decrease in virus infectivity30.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Our HACCP analysis has shown that whilst there is limited literature considering the role of 
waste as a transmission route for EBOV, it should not be discounted as a potential transmission 
route.  The collection and transportation, disposal or storage and cleaning of waste contaminated 
with blood presents the greatest transmission risk and then, risk is highest when the blood is from 
a person in advanced stages of the disease.  For waste contaminated with other body fluids, 
transmission risk is substantially lower and decreases with time.  However it is important to keep 
in mind that the current ZEBOV outbreak is presenting the scientific community with many new 
challenges, including its movement into densely populated urban centres and sustained 
transmission within such environments, a variation from previous EBOV outbreaks which have 
predominantly occurred in small, rural communities where containment and isolation was more 
possible.  The current outbreak operated at an unprecedented scale and it is possible that the 
elevated quantity of virus entering the environment may yet reveal transmission routes which 
have gone undetected or unnoticed in previous outbreaks/studies.  In the meantime it is 
recommended that our critical limit protocols are followed to ensure that the potential for EBOV 
transmission via waste materials is minimised.  
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Table 1. Summary of the Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Point assessment for the disposal of waste potentially contaminated with Ebola Virus 
Disease viral material. 
Critical Control 
Points 
Potential 
hazards 
Level of concern Proposed Critical Limits and Recommendations 
  Blood 
contaminated 
materials 
Other body fluid 
contamination 
including 
faeces, urine & 
wash water (1) 
 
1. Latrine use Contamination of 
environment 
 
High Medium Suspected and confirmed cases use isolated and segregated latrines and 
keep secure for 7 days1,2 after last use by suspected case. Secure from 
surface water inflow via external channels or concrete surroundings, and 
ensure adequate quality of construction to limit risk of collapse and 
contamination of groundwater sources3. 
First, clean surfaces using a single-use cloth with water and detergent 
which should then be incinerated. Following cleaning, wipe 0.5% 
chlorine solution2,4-7 on all surfaces, including door handles, toilet seat, 
floor, walls7. 
Wash hands with soap and water after using latrine. 
2. Washing/Cleaning Contamination of 
cleaner 
High Medium Provide proper training of cleaners and ensure experienced supervision.  
Use water and detergent for cleaning followed by 0.5% chlorinated water 
for disinfecting1,6,7. Treat wastewater as per CCP #12 of this table. 
3. Reuse/shared use 
of fomite 
Inadequate 
cleaning 
High Medium Avoid reuse where possible and dispose as per CCP #8. If re-use is 
essential wear full PPE when washing reusable materials or products*. 
Check fomite for damage and suitability for reuse. If reuse is possible, 
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clean fomite using a moist single-use cloth which should then be 
incinerated. Following cleaning, if possible hot wash (>60 °C)2,8. If not 
possible, soak in 0.5% chlorine solution6,7 for a minimum of 30 minutes 
after removing most organic material (to allow possibility of 1,2,5,8 and 
then let air dry before transporting for reuse. 
4. Transport Splashing on 
handler 
High Medium Avoid handling fresh waste. If unavoidable, wear full PPE and employ 
appropriate hand hygiene measures*. 
 Contamination of 
vehicles or 
containers 
High Medium Clean vehicles/containers at end of each transportation/shift with water 
and detergent using a moist single-use cloth which should then be 
incinerated. Following cleaning, disinfect using 0.5% chlorine solution2,5-
7. If cloth must be reused wash with warm water and detergent while 
wearing appropriate PPE to remove organic matter. Then soak in 0.05% 
chlorine for a minimum of 30 minutes and rinse with cold water9. 
Always wear full PPE when cleaning vehicles/containers and 
disinfect/burn after use. 
 Contamination of 
environment 
Medium Lower Use leak-proof containers for contaminated items e.g. plastic barrel with 
secure lid3. 
Clean outer surfaces of vehicles/containers before and after using a 
single-use cloth with water and detergent which should then be 
incinerated or if cloth must be reused wash with warm water and 
detergent while wearing appropriate PPE to remove organic matter. Then 
soak in 0.05% chlorine for a minimum of 30 minutes and rinse with cold 
water9. Following cleaning, disinfect using 0.5% chlorine solution1,5-7. 
Enclose/isolate site. 
Spills should be covered first with a cloth to avoid splashing or 
dispersion of fluids. Wipe up spill and dispose of rags through 
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incineration. Clean the area with a detergent and water and then disinfect 
using 0.5% chlorine solution by wiping area6,7. 
5. Disposal of sharps Contamination of 
handler 
High Lower Sharps should be segregated from other waste at point of generation3,5,9 
and placed in puncture-resistant, sealed biohazard-labelled containers 
and disposed of appropriately as local facilities allow3,9.  
6. Emptying of 
latrine (if latrine 
more than 2/3rds 
full) 
Contamination of 
handler  
 
Variable with  
e.g. age of 
waste, 
construction of 
latrine 
Variable with 
e.g. age of 
waste, 
construction of 
latrine 
Wait a minimum of seven days after last use by a known case before 
desludging6,10.  
If not possible to wait seven days, wear full PPE*11-13. 
7. Storage Exposure to 
contaminated 
waste 
Variable with 
age of waste 
Variable with 
age of waste 
Segregate waste into a secure nonporous container and destroy within 24 
hours6. 
8. Burning of waste  Incomplete 
combustion 
Lower Lower If waste is to be burned use an incinerator that reaches sufficient 
complete burning temperatures and meets environmental emission 
standards according to manufacturer’s operating manual. If an 
incinerator is not available burn in a barrel or pit with sufficient 
additional combustible material to ensure complete combustion6. If large 
volumes of waste need to be burned divide into smaller volumes prior to 
burning6. PPE should be worn but extreme caution needs to be taken to 
avoid the handler’s PPE catching alight. 
9. Cleaning/ 
disinfecting non-
human waste  
Stealing Lower Lower For fabric waste (e.g. bed linen and clothing) discard if possible. If has to 
be re-used wash with warm water and detergent while wearing 
appropriate PPE to remove organic matter. Then soak in 0.05% chlorine 
for a minimum of 30 minutes and rinse with cold water.  
For hard waste (e.g. crockery and buckets), wash with a detergent while 
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wearing appropriate PPE to remove organic matter. Then soak in 0.5% 
chlorine for a minimum of 10 minutes and rinse with cold water 
Items can be reused if not damaged. For items not suitable for reuse, 
dump in a secure area with limited access to animals1,2,5-7. 
10. Burial of waste  Digging up 
/stealing of 
healthcare waste 
Lower Lower Bury in reliably secure areas, with limited access to animals, and keep 
secure for 14 days after last disposal. 
Acidify or soak in 0.5% chlorine solution for 30 minutes1,2,5-7 prior to 
dumping. 
11. Disposal on 
ground 
Contamination of 
food crops  
Lower Lower13 Prevent disposal onto ground used for food crops and ensure all crops 
handled and prepared according to appropriate food safety guidelines e.g. 
WHO 200614.   
 Contamination of 
water supply 
Lower Lower Ensure water supply point is designed to prevent contamination 
following principles of sanitary assessments included in Water Safety 
Plans15. 
Encourage safe water handling and storage practices and encourage 
proven household water treatment methods such as filtration, 
chlorination or boiling6,15. 
12. Discharge and 
treatment of 
wastewater through 
sewer 
Contact with 
virus by general 
public through 
open sewers 
Lower Lower Public health education of community representatives and construction 
of physical barriers15.  Ensure appropriate conditions of carriage (in 
many places effluent streams are used by neighbours)3 by following 
sanitation safety planning guidelines3,16. 
 Contact with 
virus by workers 
at sewage 
Lower Lower Standard secondary treatment practices should be sufficient though 
recent evidence suggests a precautionary approach is advisable17. 
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*Note: Due to the nature of Ebola viruses, 100% compliance with the critical limits must be adhered to. During the execution of each and all of the 
above recommendations, appropriate hand hygiene must be employed and full PPE worn with the correct protocols observed. After each use PPE 
should be treated as an infected fomite and either disinfected or burned as per the instructions for CCPs 2/3. 
treatment plant 
13. Open defecation Humans/animals 
contact with virus 
via excrement 
Lower Lower Discourage open defecation, encourage pit latrine use. Remove 
excrement to a pit latrine or bury at a minimum depth of 0.5m.  If 
unavoidable restrict to secure area. 
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